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Abstract Branching theories are popular frameworks for modeling objective
indeterminism in the form of a future of open possibilities. In such theories, the
notion of a history plays a crucial role: it is both a basic ingredient in the axiomatic
definition of the framework, and it is used as a parameter of truth in semantics for
languages with a future tense. Furthermore, histories—complete possible courses of
events—ground the notion of modal consistency: a set of events is modally con-
sistent iff there is a history containing that set. We will explain these roles of
histories and highlight some critical aspects having to do with the fact that histories
are global and, in a relevant sense, ‘‘big’’ objects. The notion of modal consistency,
on the other hand, has both local and global aspects. We ask in how far a local
notion of modal consistency can serve as an alternative to the common uses of
histories, and work out two recent approaches to alternatives to histories. Com-
bining these approaches, we develop a novel semantics for branching time.
1 Introduction
The idea of an open future is deeply ingrained in many of our everyday concepts
and practices. Hope, regret and arguably even the notion of an action presuppose the
openness of the future, and betting and deciding make no real sense without open
future possibilities. Even concepts having no practical import, such as many
concepts of natural kinds, rely on the notion of future possibilities, since kinds of
things are usually characterized via dispositions and potentialities.
Saying this may already be contentious, given a philosophical environment in
which Lewis’s project of Humean supervenience is held in high esteem. It will be
even more contentious to say the next thing: that the possibilities involved have to
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be interpreted objectively—as possibilities grounded in the way our world is like,
independently of us—, and not as mere epistemic possibilities—grounded in the
way we picture the world, be it in everyday talk or via scientific theories.
For present purposes it will be enough to acknowledge that the notion of an open
future makes initial sense, and that it has its uses, whatever its ultimate metaphysical
standing. It certainly is in need of elucidation.
Arguably, the best way to tackle the notion of an open future is via theories of
branching histories—theories that take the everyday notion of ‘‘one present
moment, many possibilities in the future’’ at face value and accordingly picture the
world as a branching tree of possible courses of events, or via similar, technically
more involved models. The hope is that formal branching theories can be both
‘‘proto-humanistic’’ and ‘‘proto-scientific’’ (Belnap 2007), thereby doing justice to
the two ‘‘images of man’’ that Sellars (1963) introduced: the ‘‘manifest’’ image of
everyday life and the ‘‘scientific’’ image that we create through our scientific
practices.
Again, there is a big debate about the virtues of theories of branching histories,
with respect to which we wish to remain officially neutral—in order to motivate our
enterprise, it will be enough to grant that such theories make initial sense as attempts
to spell out the notion of an open future, and to acknowledge that there are well
developed, mathematically precise formal frameworks for branching histories.
There are two main strands of branching theories that have been discussed in
metaphysics, semantics and philosophy of science to at least some extent: the Prior/
Thomason theory of branching time (Prior 1967; Thomason 1970), and Belnap’s
theory of branching space-times (BST; Belnap 1992). In both these theories, a
crucial role is played by the notion of an (alternative) history: given a mathematical
structure representing our world (with its thisworldly, but incompatible open futures
of possibility), histories are singled out as maximally consistent substructures, in
some modal sense of consistency.1 Histories play at least two important roles in
branching theories: (1) They are often used in the formulation of the axiomatic basis
of a branching theory itself, e.g., in Belnap’s prior choice principle (see Sect. 2.2
below); (2) they play a crucial role in the semantics for the future tense that can be
defined on the basis of such theories.
The present paper is concerned with developing some alternatives to the use of
histories. This enterprise is motivated by the fact that even though histories are not
possible worlds, they are still large structures with a global ring to them: given a
branching structure, its histories normally extend as far, both spatially and
temporally, as the structure itself. The technical employment of histories, however,
often only uses local aspects of histories—in some non-technical sense of locality to
be clarified—, and epistemic access to whole histories of our world is impossible.
The paper thus continues a search for appropriate small structures for BST that was
begun in papers by Placek (2011) and Mu¨ller (2010).
1 By ‘‘modal consistency’’ of a set of events, or ‘‘modal compatibilty’’ of two events, we mean to refer to
an intuitive notion that is in need of explication. Roughly, a set of events is modally consistent iff all the
events can occur together, none of them excluding the occurrence of any of the others. Note that we are
not referring to a syntactical notion of consistency here.
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We start by introducing the two mentioned relevant formal branching theories,
branching time and branching space-times, and their respective history definitions,
in Sect. 2. The worries alluded to above will be spelled out in Sect. 3, where we look
in more detail at the notion of modal consistency that stands behind the definition of
a history in the two frameworks. We will try to explicate philosophical assumptions
about modal consistency with a view to possible generalizations. Such generaliza-
tions are the topic of Sect. 4. We will work out two recent approaches: consistency
in terms of possible continuations, as proposed by Placek (2011), and consistency in
terms of sets of indeterministic transitions. Both approaches in our view provide
promising local alternatives to the usual employment of histories, and their
combination leads to a novel semantics for branching time.
2 Histories in Branching Theories
We start by discussing the case of branching time (Sect. 2.1) before considering the
more complex case of branching space-times (Sect. 2.2). We will develop branching
time in a way that makes the extension to branching space-times go smoothly.
2.1 Histories in Branching Time
The notion of an open future of possibilities brings together a temporal notion—the
future—with a modal one—possibility. Interaction between time and modality is a
common fact of everyday life; witness ‘‘no use crying over spilt milk’’: before the
spilling, we assume it was possible to prevent it, but now it isn’t any more, and we
have to move on. Living, we think, means making use of some possibilities and
letting others go by; and they don’t come back.
This picture—for what it’s worth—is well captured by the idea of the world (our
world, the world we live in) as a branching tree of possibilities, such as the one
pictured in Fig. 1.
This image is explored in many works of fiction, such as the 1993 French movies
Smoking/No Smoking, but it has also been worked out in terms of a logical theory
called branching time (BT). Prior (1967, 122–127), following a suggestion by
Kripke dating from 1958, gives a brief description of the main ideas; Thomason
(1970) has the first fully worked-out system, which he uses in the context of




Fig. 1 A branching tree of
possibilities: rain or no rain at 4
o’clock
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Technically, one defines the class of branching trees—BT-structures—as follows:
Definition 1 (BT-structure) A BT-structure is a non-empty partial order of
moments hM; i (i.e., a nonempty set M with a transitive and antisymmetric
relation B ) such that
(1) there is no backward branching, i.e., for all m; m0; m00 2 M for which m0 \ m
and m00 \ m, we have either m0 B m00 or m00 B m0;
(2) any elements m and m0 have a greatest common lower bound in M;
(3) M has no maximal elements, i.e., for any m 2 M, there is some m0 2 M s.t.
m \ m0.
The strict\order corresponding to B, used in clause (1), is defined, as usual, via
m\m0 ,df ðmm0 & m 6¼ m0Þ:
Of the three mentioned conditions, (1) is standard, (2) and (3) are optional, but
are included here for reasons of continuity with the case of branching space-times
that is the subject of Sect. 2.2.
A further condition (4), which is especially useful if one wants to identify clock
times across incompatible alternatives (e.g., rain or no rain at 4 o’clock, as in
Fig. 1), already relies on the notion of a history, as does the use of BT-structures
(also called BT-frames) in semantics.2 Histories are taken to be complete possible
courses of events: a history has to be (a) modally consistent in the sense of being
possible as a whole (no event in a history excluding the occurrence of any other),
and (b) maximally so. In BT the definition is as follows:
Definition 2 (History in BT) Given a BT-structure hM; i; a set h  M is a
history iff h is a maximal linear subset, or a maximal chain, in M, i.e., a subset h that
is linearly ordered (for any m; m0 2 h; either m0 B m or m \ m0) and such that no
proper superset h0) h has that feature.
Thus, modal consistency (a) is spelled out in terms of order-relatedness: a subset
of M is modally consistent iff it is a chain, i.e., if any two of its members are order-
related. This makes intuitive sense: in a branching tree of open future possibilities,
you cannot consistently mix two incompatible futures after they have branched, so
that consistency requires linearity. For example, events a and b in Fig. 1 are not
order related, so there is no history containing them both. If there is only one history
(which would be the case in a deterministic world), all of M is linearly ordered.
Maximality (b) is spelled out in the usual set-theoretic sense: histories are
modally consistent and such that no proper superset is consistent. If you add even a
single moment to a history, you will have added in a moment that is not order-
related to all the others; the extended set then contains an incomparable and thus,
inconsistent pair of moments.
In terms of histories, condition (2) of Definition 1 above says that all histories
have a non-empty intersection, and that that intersection contains a greatest element.
By (1), histories are downward closed, i.e., if m 2 h and m0 B m, then m0 2 h:
2 Condition (4) also moves BT structures closer to branching space-times, since order isomorphism of
histories to R enforces continuous structures.
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We can now also formulate the (optional) condition (4) mentioned above, which
allows us to define clock times via a partition of M:
Optional Addendum to Definition 1
(4) All histories in M are order-isomorphic, i.e., if h, h0 are histories in M, then
there is a bijective mapping f : h ! h0 s.t. for all m; m0 2 h; we have m B m0
iff f(m) B f(m0). Often it is useful to require that all histories in M are order-
isomorphic to the real numbers, R; this further strengthens the parallel
between BT and BST, as models of BST are required to be continuous. We
will assume, in addition, that there is a function Time : M ! R that gives a
clock time Time(m) for each moment m 2 M:
This condition makes essential use of the history definition, showing that the notion
of a history in BT can play an important role in the axiomatics. The condition also
highlights the motivation for calling elements m 2 M ‘‘moments’’ and not ‘‘times’’:
many different (in fact, modally incompatible) moments can have the same clock time.
Above we also mentioned a second important use of histories: they function as
parameters of truth in the semantics of the future tense. (Again, contentious issues
are lurking, this time connected with the idea of a so-called Thin Red Line which
makes possible an alternative semantics for the future tense; part of the debate is
whether such a semantics still captures indeterminism. See Belnap et al. (2001, Ch.
6B, 8D), Øhrstrøm (2009) and Øhrstrøm and Hasle (2011) for discussion.)
From now on we will be using not just BT-structures, but also models built upon
BT-structures: a BT-model M ¼ hM;  ; vi is a BT-structure hM; i together with
a valuation v that is invoked in the truth conditions for atomic sentences.3 In case
condition (4) is fulfilled, we will be dealing with models M ¼ hM;  ; Time; vi;
where Time is a clock-time function as discussed above.
There is a problem about defining a future tense operator F based on such
models, intimately related to the time-honored problem of future contingents (see,
e.g., Øhrstrøm and Hasle 2011). Speaking from within the branching tree—at the
moment of an utterance context, mC—there are usually many histories passing
through that moment, many possible futures. How do we decide whether a sentence
referring to the future is true or not? An objective understanding of the openness of
the future demands that none of the histories be singled out or marked as ‘‘the real
future’’, in contradistinction to all the others: we have to be egalitarians with respect
to future possibilities if we want to retain objective indeterminism.4 This means that
a context of utterance cannot supply a ‘‘true future of the utterance’’—all possible
futures have to be treated on a par. But how do we define truth conditions then? One
option, which Prior (1967, 128–134) called ‘‘Peircean’’, would be to quantify over
all available histories universally. A sentence of the form F/ is then taken to be true
at some m iff on all histories passing through m (in all possible futures of m) there is
a future moment at which / is true. This however leads to awkward results: truth
thereby coincides with settled truth; ‘‘it will be’’ is given the sense of ‘‘it is now
3 We will not need to consider the details in what follows. For a careful exposition of BT semantics, see
Belnap et al. (2001).
4 For the record, this is where supporters of a Thin Red Line such as Øhrstrøm (2009) would disagree.
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unpreventable that it will be’’—which does not mesh well with common uses of the
future tense in common discourse.5
The innovative idea behind the so-called Ockhamist semantics for the future
tense in BT is to evaluate a sentence not just with respect to a model M and a given
moment m in a BT-structure, but also with respect to a given history h through that
moment. (It is customary to write such a moment-history pair as ‘‘m/h’’, indicating
the presupposition that m 2 h:) The past (‘‘P’’) and future tense (‘‘F’’) are then taken
to move evaluation along that given history, backward (for the past) or forward (for
the future), in accordance with the following semantic rules that resemble the tense
logic for linear time:
• M; m=h  P/ iff there is some m0 2 h for which m0 \ m and M; m0=h  /;
• M; m=h  F/ iff there is some m0 2 h for which m \ m0 and M; m0=h  /:
While the history is superfluous in the clause for the past tense (given past
linearity of BT-structures; see clause (1) of Definition 1), the history is really needed
for definiteness of the clause for F.6
We will not embark on a more detailed discussion of Ockhamist semantics here.
(See, e.g., Belnap (2002a), Øhrstrøm (2009) and Øhrstrøm and Hasle (2011) for a
discussion of some controversial issues; MacFarlane (2013, Ch. 9) gives a detailed
overview.) The main point for this paper is that in Ockhamist semantics (as well as
in many of its rivals), histories are needed as parameters of truth in the semantic
clauses of the language.
We will leave it at that for now: we have shown that histories—maximal modally
consistent sets in a BT-structure, where consistency is spelled out as linearity—play
an important role for the theory of branching time. The picture is similar, but also
somewhat more intricate, in the case of branching space-times.
2.2 Histories in Branching Space-Times
While branching time allows one to capture some important aspects of the
interaction between time and modality, it leaves out spatial relations among events.
Indeed, a ‘‘moment’’ in a BT-structure, if interpreted realistically, has to be a
‘‘super-event’’ (Thomson 1977) spanning all of space simultaneously. This is an
idea that does not mesh well with basic insights of relativity theory, according to
which there is no fact of the matter as to whether distant (technically: space-like
related) events are simultaneous or not. Furthermore, it is hard, in BT, to spell out
how two things happening at the same moment can be either dependent (my coin’s
5 Quantifying over histories existentially, which coincides with giving F the standard semantics for a
weak modal operator, fares even worse: it leads to the assessment that, e.g., in Aristotle’s famous case of
tomorrow’s sea battle, it both will be the case that there is a sea battle and it will be the case that there is
no sea battle tomorrow. This is surely wrong. Lewis, in his famous but contested argument against
branching (Lewis 1986, 207f.), seems to be relying on just this flawed understanding of the future tense
(see also Belnap et al. (2001, Ch. 7B.2) for a discussion of Lewis). There are well-known alternatives; see
the main text.
6 A history is also needed for the clause of the ‘‘seeing to it that’’ operator of the stit-logic of agency that
extends Ockhamist BT semantics; see Belnap et al. (2001) for an overview.
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landing heads, the coin making a sound when landing) or independent (my coin’s
landing heads, your coin’s landing heads). More structure is needed; a plausible
candidate for such additional structure is the space-time of relativity theory.
The big question is how to keep incorporating time (now: space-time) and
modality in a single formal structure. A useful rewording of that question is: What is
a history in BST, i.e., a maximal modally consistent set? Again this can be split up
into two subquestions. We can safely assume that the maximality of a history can
again be spelled out in set-theoretic terms, as in the case of BT. The difficult
question that remains is: What does the notion of modal consistency come to?
Again, a clue from the single history case may be helpful: if there is just one
history, the whole structure should be a single space-time. But how should that idea
be captured formally? How can we characterize the unity of a space-time?
Belnap’s crucial insight in working out BST (Belnap 1992) was that one could
keep the basic structure of a partial ordering of (not moments, but smaller, spatially
local) possible point events in place and use a rather intuitive notion of modal
consistency motivated by a consideration of perspective: intuitively, events e1 and
e2 are modally compatible (can co-occur in one course of events) iff there is a
perspective (given by a third event f) from which one can say that both events have
occurred. Formally, two events e1 and e2 are modally compatible iff they have a
common upper bound, i.e., iff there is some f for which e1 B f and e2 B f. Just like
in branching time, the fixedness of the past in contrast to the openness of the future
is the key to understanding modal consistency.
BST-structures are thus partial orderings hW ; i (fulfilling certain additional
conditions to be spelled out below), and modally consistent subsets A of W are such
that for any e1; e2 2 A there is f 2 A for which e1 B f and e2 B f. Such sets are
called (upward) directed. In a directed set, for any two of its members the set itself
incorporates a perspective from which these two members lie in the (causal) past.
Adding in the set-theoretic notion of maximality, the history definition of BST is
thus the following:
Definition 3 (History in BST) A history in a BST-structure hW ; i is a subset
h  W that is upward directed and maximally so, i.e., no proper superset of which is
directed.
It remains to spell out what a BST-structure is. In that definition, histories play an
important role in a number of places. We follow Belnap in calling a branching
structure—in this case, a BST-structure—‘‘our world’’, or OW: it incorporates non-
trivial, thisworldly modality.
Definition 4 (BST-structure) A non-empty partial order OW ¼ hW ; i is a BST-
structure iff
(1) OW has no maxima (i.e., for any e 2 W there is some f 2 W s.t. e \ f);
(2) each lower bounded chain (i.e., a linearly ordered subset C  W for which
there is some e 2 W s.t. for any f 2 C, e B f) has an infimum (a greatest lower
bound) in W;
(3) for each upper bounded chain C  W and for each history h  W ; if C  h;
then C has a supremum-in-h.
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(4) (prior choice principle) if h1,h2 are histories and C is a lower bounded chain in
h1 - h2 (i.e., a lower bounded chain wholly in h1 no element of which lies in
h2), then there is some e 2 h1 \ h2 s.t. e \ C (i.e., for all f 2 C; e \ f) and
such that e is maximal in h1 \ h2.
In this definition, the notion of a history plays an essential role in clauses
(3) and (4).7
This role of histories parallels the—less important—role that histories play in the
definition of (specific types of) BT-structures. The parallel also holds for the second
role of the history parameter in BT, viz., as a parameter of truth in semantic clauses.
While we will not spell out a semantics for a language based on BST, it should be
clear that the reasoning for the BT case applies as well: a context of utterance can
specify a number of relevant parameters of truth—certainly the utterance event of
the context, eC, itself, and possibly also a rest frame grounding a notion of
simultaneity—, but on pain of denying the objectivity of an open future, it cannot
single out as ‘‘the real future’’ one of the histories through eC rather than some other.
So we see that the notion of a history, both in BT and in BST, plays at least two
important roles: as a building block for the definition of certain relevant structures,
and as a parameter for semantic theory. We will now move on to a more detailed
discussion of modal consistency, which will give rise to some worries about the
mentioned uses of histories.
3 Modal Consistency
Above we have laid out how an intuitive notion of modal consistency is spelled out in
order-theoretic terms in the two branching theories considered here, BT and BST. The
respective history definitions lead to ‘‘big’’ histories in the sense that they span a
complete possible temporal development within the branching tree of possibilities (in
BT), or a whole space-time (in BST). That is, histories are ‘‘big’’ relative to the
branching order in which they are defined. In what follows, we will assume that that
branching order is meant to cover all of our (indeterministic) world, and so we will be
speaking of histories as whole temporal courses of events from the big bang until after
the death of the sun (in BT), or as whole space-times (in BST). Of course, a history
cannot be bigger than the branching order in which it is defined—the important point
is that it is global with respect to that ordering. There is however also a more ‘‘local’’,
generalized notion of modal consistency. We will motivate that notion here with a
view towards technical considerations that will be the subject of Sect. 4.
3.1 Ways of Specifying Modal Consistency
It will be good to first discuss some assumptions about the notion of modal
consistency that we are working with. For this we will not presuppose that we are
working with a theory based on partial orders (such as BT and BST), but admit also
7 The axiomatic system of BST is therefore second order.
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more general resources. There appear to be three ways to spell out modal
consistency.
1. First, modal consistency can be specified explicitly. When we map out
possibilities in the form of stories, for example, we will normally describe the
individual options directly, thereby (implictly) proclaiming them to be
individually modally consistent. If I deliberate where to go next weekend, for
example, I will map out individual options separately (to a very limited degree
of detail of course), and there is no need for me to ‘‘carve up’’ any given larger
structure containing all these possibilities into individual, consistent scenarios.
Technically, option (1) amounts to treating histories as basic entities.
2. Second, it can be helpful to tackle the notion of modal consistency via its
negation, modal inconsistency. The idea here is that if we have a full list of
possible sources of modal inconsistency, we thereby have a guarantee that any
scenario we specify that avoids the pitfalls, is thereby already modally
consistent. One clear source of modal inconsistency is running together
different ‘‘local’’ alternatives—in a sense to be specified. For example, it cannot
be that the same thing has incompatible properties, like being red all over and
being green all over, at the same time. Any scenario that describes things in
such an inconsistent way is thereby itself inconsistent. A similar principle
works against combinations of things that by their nature cannot be in one
scenario together; not all things can coexist. It seems difficult, however, to spell
this out in a perspicuous formal way in full generality.
For a formally clear principle in the vicinity of these considerations, consider
the following: if there are alternatives to a certain happening (such as my
walking to the market today, when I could have stayed at home, or taken the
bike), then a consistent scenario cannot contain more than one of them. If it runs
together different concrete alternatives, we may call a scenario blatantly
inconsistent, a clear sign of modal inconsistency. Furthermore, while a scenario
may not be blatantly inconsistent the way it is described, we may know that
filling in gaps in the description will lead to blatant inconsistency. As
mentioned, the hope behind this second approach is that one may be able to list
all ways in which inconsistencies can arise, and thereby derive a positive
definition of modal consistency indirectly.
3. A third approach is to take the mentioned formal definitions of modal
consistency and extend them by relaxing certain assumptions. It is hard to see
what this should amount to in the case of BT, but there is a clear motivation for
wanting to relax BST’s history definition specified in terms of directedness.
3.2 A First Reason for Relaxing BST’s History Definition
The definition of a history as a maximal directed set in BST has the following trivial
consequence: if in a BST-structure hW ; i there is only a single history, then that
history—which is equal to all of W—must itself be directed. This is a limitation of
BST: even in the (deterministic) case of just a single history, that history is forced to
be a directed set. It seems clear, however, that there are modally consistent scenarios
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that do not correspond to a directed set of space-time points. We can think of two
classes of examples here. First, there are space-times that are not time-orientable,
i.e., for which we cannot define a global ordering.8 Such an ordering is however
needed in the definition of a directed set. Thus, for non-time-orientable space-times,
the BST approach to modal consistency is inappropriate. Second, even if we limit
attention to standard examples of time-orientable space-times, in describing a
scenario we may restrict attention to a (small) region of space-time rather than all of
space-time. We will then want to be able to say that there are, e.g., two different
(modally incompatible) alternatives for the region in question, each of which is
itself modally consistent. Using directedness as the criterion of consistency will not
work in such a case unless the region is itself directed,9 or consistency of an
alternative for the region is treated as a merely derivative concept. It seems
therefore that the BST definition of modal consistency enforces too strict a global
constraint here, and that a more local, relaxed definition of modal consistency
should fare better.
One may even have the following worry: Given that we may want to depict a
scenario in a chosen geometrical region of space-time, may not the BST definition
of a history wrongly identify ‘‘additional’’ histories, i.e., mistake aspects of
geometrical shape for modal branching? Here we have a somewhat comforting
(though rather limited) result precluding the creation of spurious histories.
By Minkowski space-time we mean the following:
Definition 5 (ordered n-dimensional Minkowski space-time) For n C 2, the n-
dimensional Minkowski space-time Mn is the n-dimensional Euclidean space Rn
(with its usual topology) together with the (causal) ordering B defined by10
hx1; . . .; xni hy1; . . .; yni iff
x1  y1 and ðx2  y2Þ2 þ    þ ðxn  ynÞ2 ðx1  y1Þ2:
Elements hx1; . . .; xni and hy1; . . .; yni that are not order-related, are called space-like
related.
Here is the mentioned theorem. While it falls short of fully characterizing all
single history models of BST in Minkowski space-time, it illustrates a general point
that motivates a generalization of the BST definition of modal consistency.
Theorem 1 Let the region R  M2 be an open set in two-dimensional Minkowski
space-time with ordering B. Let R be downward closed (i.e., if x 2 R and y 2 M2
s.t. y B x, then y 2 R) and such that each upper bounded chain in R has a supremum
8 A simple example is a two-dimensional Mo¨bius strip; see Malament (2012, Sects. 1.11 and 2.2) for
details. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this example.
9 Given the standard causal ordering of Minkowski space-time (see Definition 5), e.g., the unit circle or a
rectangular region of space-time are not directed.
10 We are giving this simplified definition using coordinates so as not to presuppose any differential
geometry. For a clear exposition of the latter approach, which is standard in physics, see Malament (2012
Sect. 2.2). Here, we are assuming coordinates in which the speed of light c = 1; x1 is the time coordinate,
x2; . . .; xn are spatial coordinates. The inequality holds iff the spatial interval can be covered by a ray of
light, or something moving at lesser speed, during the temporal interval.
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in R and each lower bounded chain in R has an infimum in R. Then hR; i is a BST
model iff R is directed.
Proof The ‘‘(’’ direction is trivial: if R is directed, it is the unique maximal
directed subset of R itself, so that R has just one history, trivializing the prior choice
principle (PCP). The other axioms of BST are fulfilled by assumption (note that an
open set in M2 cannot have a maximum). h
In order to prove the ‘‘)’’ direction, we derive a contradiction from the
assumption that there are (at least) two different histories in R. That way we have
shown that R contains only a single (directed) history and thus, must itself be
directed.
So, assume that there are two histories h1; h2  R with h1 6¼ h2; meaning that
there must be e 2 h1  h2: This e constitutes a (trivial) chain, so by the PCP there
must be some s 2 h1 \ h2 s.t. s \ e and s is maximal in h1 \ h2: Now by density
(which follows from the fact that R is an open set) we can find f for which s \ f \ e,
and working in coordinates and using downward closedness of R we can indeed find
such an f on the intersection of the rim of the backward light cone of e and the rim of
the forward light cone of s. Clearly f 2 h1; by downward closure of histories. Now
let C be a chain whose proper supremum is f (for f ¼ hf1; f2i; we can use
C ¼ fhf1  1=n; f2i j n 2 Ng); by downward closure we have C  h1: Now we can
show that C  h2 as well: Assume otherwise, then there has to be some c 2 C such
that c 2 h1  h2; the PCP gives us a choice point s0 \ c maximal in h1 \ h2; which
must be different from s as C (and therefore c) lies below f, and by construction of
C, s 6 c: s and s0, both being maxima of h1 \ h2; must be space-like related. By
directedness of histories h1 and h2, there have to be upper bounds ti 2 hi with
s, s0 B ti, i = 1,2. Now let x be the unique intersection of the forward light cones of
s and s0; we have x B t1 and x B t2, and thus, by downward closure of histories,
x 2 h1 \ h2: But s \ x, contradicting maximality of s in h1 \ h2:
We have shown that C  h2 as well. By assumption there is a supremum-in-h2,
f 0 2 h2: We can show that f = f 0, which proves our theorem, since then we have
s \ f with f 2 h1 \ h2; contradicting the maximality of s. So, assume f = f 0, so that
f 0 2 h2  h1; the PCP gives us a choice point r maximal in h1 \ h2 s.t. r \ f 0. Now
as f 0 is the supremum-in-h2 of C, there is some c2 2 C for which r \ c2. But
c2 2 C  h1 \ h2; contradicting the maximality of r. Thus, f = f 0, and our theorem
is proved. h
This theorem may give us some comfort: its upshot is that if a region fulfills a
number of reasonable constraints including clauses (1)–(3) of Definition 4, then the
full set of BST axioms (and thus, the prior choice principle as the most characteristic
BST axiom, clause (4)) is fulfilled if and only if the region is a directed set; the BST
model then accordingly has only one history. Thus, the BST definition of modal
consistency does not create spurious histories, in the following sense: there is no
reasonable region (fulfilling the premises of the theorem) that fulfils the BST axioms
in such a way that the region is split up into more than one history. This would be
bad since we know that the full 2-dimensional Minkowski space-time does not
contain modally incompatible events, and therefore no subregion can contain
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modally incompatible events either; so any region is modally consistent. BST
accords with this assessment, at least for the regions for which the theorem applies.
The theorem however also reinforces the worry mentioned above: why shouldn’t it
be possible to have a modally consistent (single history) scenario in a non-directed
region of space-time (see note 9 above)? It seems that the BST demand of global
directedness rules out too many intuitively sensible scenarios. Maybe the directedness
requirement can be localized? This is in fact so, leading to the project of defining
modal consistency via so-called continuations (Placek 2011); see Sect. 4.1 below.
3.3 A Semantical Reason for Generalizing Modal Consistency
So far we have motivated a generalization of BST’s definition of modal consistency
by recourse to the role of histories in the BST axioms: it seems that that role leads to
spurious geometrical constraints on BST models that should be relaxed. Above we
also pointed out that the notion of a history, and thus the notion of modal
consistency, plays another role in BT and BST: it is used as a semantic parameter of
truth. If we want to evaluate a sentence about the future, we normally need to
specify which of the equally possible futures we mean to refer to, for otherwise no
assessment may be possible.
But do we really need to specify a full history, a full course of events from the
beginning till the end of time? That seems a bit too much, really, and it can’t be
what is going on when we assess sentences containing the future tense: we have to
make do with much more limited information. And we can. In fact, MacFarlane’s
project of spelling out a notion of relative truth via assessment sensitivity
(MacFarlane 2003, 2013) gives a useful model for how we can often determine a
truth value for sentences about the future of their context of utterance, given in
addition a second, later context of assessment (see also Belnap (2002a) on ‘‘double
time references’’). In order to develop a more general picture that also applies to
BST, however, we have to spell out modal consistency in terms of transitions—a
notion that we need to introduce before we can go on.
In a model of BT or of BST, we can sensibly ask where or when histories branch.
We will discuss the more general case of BST; given our assumptions about maxima
in the intersection of any two histories in BT (which is meant to mimic BST’s prior
choice postulate), transfer from BST to BT is immediate.
We need the following defined relations:
Definition 6 (Undividedness; splitting) We call two histories h1 and h2 undivided
at e; h1 e h2; iff (a) e 2 h1 \ h2 and (b) there is some e0 [ e for which e0 2 h1 \ h2:
Undividedness at some e means that two histories continue to overlap for at least a
little while after e. On the other hand, if e is maximal in h1 \ h2; so that e is a choice
point for the two histories, we say that h1 and h2 split at e; h1 ?e h2:
It turns out, given the axiomatic basis of BST, that undividedness at e is an
equivalence relation. This means that the set He of histories containing e is
partitioned into equivalence classes via :e. The elements of this partition we can
call the possibilities open at e—there are normally (far) fewer than there are
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histories through e, as histories can split (much) later. The selection of one of the
possibilities open at some e corresponds to a basic transition.
Definition 7 (Basic transition) Let e 2 W in a BST-structure hW ; i; and let :e
be the relation of undividedness-at-e among histories of W; let He be the set of
histories in W containing e. The partition of He via :e, the set of possibilities open
at e, is denoted Pe: For H 2 Pe; we call the pair he; Hi; also written eH; a basic
transition. If Pe ¼ fHg ¼ fHeg (i.e., the partition has just one element,
corresponding to :e being the universal relation on He), we call the transition
eH trivial, otherwise, indeterministic. We call e the initial and H the outcome of
the transition eH:
The notion of a transition allows for a fresh look at modal consistency. Instead of
asking whether a total scenario is modally consistent or not (which, as we have seen,
is decided in BST via directedness), we can ask whether a set of transitions is
consistent or not. From a global point of view, this is easy: given a BST-structure, a
set of transitions is consistent iff there is a history in which all of the transitions
occur together; a maximally consistent set of transitions then fully corresponds to a
history (see Lemma 1 below). Formally, for T ¼ fti ¼ eiHi j i 2 Ig; with I an
index set, we can define the set of histories allowed by T, H(T), to be
HðTÞ :¼ \i2IHi:
T is consistent iff HðTÞ 6¼ ;; i.e., iff T allows at least one history to occur.11
In order to develop a more local approach to transitions, it is useful to consider
the transitions themselves as an ordered set, in accordance with the following
definition:
Definition 8 (Transition ordering) Given a BST-structure OW ¼ hW ; i with the
set TR(OW) of basic indeterministic transitions, and transitions t1 ¼ e1H1; t2 ¼
e2H2 2 TRðOWÞ; we say that t1 is below t2 ðt1  t2Þ iff (a) e1 \ e2 and (b)
H2  H1: In the same vein, for t1 ¼ e1H1 and e 2 W ; we say that t1 is below
e ðt1  eÞ iff e1 \ e and He  H1:
This defines a partial ordering  among all the transitions TR(OW) in a BST-
structure OW (the ordering properties carry over from\and ). Note that different
transitions with the same initial, which are modally incompatible, are incomparable
according to : Such a partial ordering can form a natural interface for specifying a
BST-structure with much less information than the full BST partial ordering among
events; this theme is developed in detail in Mu¨ller (2010).
The following Lemma shows that histories are maximally consistent in the
transition sense of consistency, too.
Lemma 1 (Histories and maximally consistent sets of transitions) Let OW ¼
hW ; i be a BST structure without funny business (see Sect. 4.2 below) and TR(OW)
its set of indeterministic (non-trivial) basic transitions. Let T  TRðOWÞ be a set of
transitions that is downward closed (i.e., if t 2 T and t 0 2 TRðOWÞ s.t. t 0  t, then
11 In accord with standard conventions, we take the empty intersection to be maximal, so that for T ¼ ;;
we have H(T) = the set of all histories in hW; i:
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also t 0 2 T). Then T is maximally consistent (i.e., T is consistent but no proper
superset is) iff there is a history h in OW s.t. H(T) = {h}. Thus, a maximally
consistent set of transitions admits a singleton set containing just one specific history.
Proof ‘‘)’’: In case HðTÞ ¼ ;; T is not consistent and thus, a fortiori, not
maximally so. So, let T be such that there are histories h1; h2 2 HðTÞ; h1 6¼ h2: Then
T is consistent. We have to show that it isn’t maximally consistent. So let e 2
h1  h2; by the prior choice principle there is some choice point s \ e maximal in
h1 \ h2; and Ps has at least two members; let H be the member of Ps containing h1,
we know that h2 62 H: Let t ¼ sH; t is an indeterministic basic transition in
TR(OW), and t 62 T as t excludes h2 [ H(T). Then the set T0 = T [ {t} is consistent
(HðT 0Þ 	 fh1g), so T isn’t maximally consistent.
‘‘(’’: If T is inconsistent, HðTÞ ¼ ;. So let T be consistent but not maximally so,
i.e., there is some non-trivial t ¼ eH 2 TRðOWÞ  T s.t. T [ {t} is consistent. As
T is downward closed, t must be maximal in T [ {t}. By consistency, HðTÞ \ H 6¼ ;;
whence HðTÞ \ He 6¼ ;; as H  He: In fact we have H  HðTÞ; as t is maximal in the
transition ordering. We even have that all of He  HðTÞ : we have He ¼ [Pe; and
any local alternative t0 ¼ eH0 with the same initial e as t and some H0 2 Pe is also
maximal w.r.t. T, and thus, T[ {t0} is consistent as well, securing H0  HðTÞ:12 But as
t is non-trivial, there are at least two non-empty members of the partition Pe of He, i.e.,
there are at least two histories h1; h2 2 He; h1 6¼ h2: As He  HðTÞ; the set H(T) thus
cannot be a singleton. h
While the definition of consistency for sets of transitions via histories is
straightforward, it would however also be useful to have a more properly local
characterization of consistency. One thing is clear: a consistent set must not contain
two different transitions with the same initial—that would be blatantly inconsistent.
Furthermore, any subset of a consistent set of transitions is also consistent. Spelling
out further local conditions of consistency and inconsistency is an intricate issue,
especially given the possibility of modal correlations (so-called modal funny
business, mentioned in note 12). We will discuss these issues in Sect. 4.2 below.
Transitions are ‘‘where the action is’’: at the initial of an indeterministic
transition, there are different possibilities for the immediate future.13 One can
characterize a scenario within a BST-structure fully by giving the transitions that
occur in it. Here is the promise of sets of transitions for semantics: in evaluating a
sentence as to its truth or falsity, it should normally not be necessary to specify a
maximal consistent set of transitions corresponding to a history. Specifying some
consistent set of transitions should be enough. In this way we can hope to combine
12 At this step the absence of modal funny business is required to secure the consistency of T [ {t0}. In
branching time, this condition is trivially fulfilled and therefore plays no role; for the case of BST, see
Sect. 4.2 below.
13 In the stit-logic of agency (see note 6), an agent’s choice at a moment is also modeled by an initial e
together with a bundle of histories containing e—the only difference to transitions is that a choice may be
less fine-grained than a transition, i.e., bundle together different members of Pe; or different transitions
with initial e. It seems reasonable that an agent’s control over what will happen may be less fine-grained
than the immediate possibilities themselves, and for independent agents in BT, coarse-grained choices are
a must (see Belnap et al. 2001, Sect. 7C.4).
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insights of both Belnap’s idea of ‘‘double time references’’ and of MacFarlane’s
theory of relative truth for future contingents. Small sets of transitions can play the
relevant role in semantics because the carry enough information, and they have a
good chance of being epistemically and computationally tractable.14
4 Alternatives to Histories
The two types of considerations for rethinking modal consistency mentioned
above—relaxing the history definition of BST for more generality; focusing on sets
of transitions for a more local view—can be identified as driving forces behind
recent work by Placek (2011) and Mu¨ller (2010). We describe Placek’s general-
ization of modal consistency in terms of ‘‘snake-links’’ in Sect. 4.1 before
considering the ‘‘sets of transitions’’-approach in Sect. 4.2. We will draw some
lessons for semantics, combining ideas from both approaches, in Sect. 4.3.
4.1 Continuations
In Sect. 3.2 we have seen that BST’s history definition enforces geometrical
constraints on possible space-times that are not independently motivated. There is a
rather natural generalization of BST’s notion of modal consistency in terms of
directedness that properly generalizes the allowed range of space-times. Placek
(2011) has developed the idea of ‘‘continuations’’ as a background for spelling out
possibilities without the notion of possible worlds or histories. In that paper he also
develops the generalized notion of modal consistency that we will discuss.
Recall the motivation for viewing directedness as a criterion for modal
compatibility: if there is a perspective from which both events e1 and e2 have
occurred, then e1 and e2 are modally compatible. One may ask why it is necessary that
there be a global perspective on e1 and e2. It seems that a suitable multitude of local
perspectives should also be enough to guarantee local consistency: e.g., if there is no
f above both e1 and e2, but there is some f1 above e1 and some f2 below f1 such that
there is some f3 above f2 and e2, that should also do. See Fig. 2 for the idea.
15 Based on











Fig. 2 A snake-link between e1
and e2
14 The latter point also seems important when it comes to linking the BST framework with applications
in computer science. For such applications, specifying a scenario in terms of a global partial ordering is
‘‘too thick’’—a smaller, discrete data structure is needed. Such an idea is explored in Mu¨ller (2010).
15 ‘‘Suitable’’ needs emphasis. What has been said so far, and what is in Fig. 2, is in fact not enough to
guarantee modal compatibility of e1 and e2—any events in a BST model can be linked via an M-shaped
path (Belnap 1992, Fact 14); if f2 is ‘‘too far below’’, e1 and e2 may be incompatible after all. See
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Here is the official definition, including the important generalization of ‘‘being
snake-linked in a region’’:
Definition 9 (Snake-link (in a region)) Let hW, B i be a partial order. Events
e, f [ W are snake-linked (e& f) iff there is some n 2 N and there are elements
e0,…, en [ W such that (a) e0 = e, en = f and (b) for i = 1,…, n, we have either
ei-1 B ei or ei B ei-1.
e and f are snake-linked in a region R  W (e&R f) iff there is a snake-link
e0 = e,…, en = f such that all of e0,…, en [ R.
In order to generalize the notion of modal consistency via snake-links, we need two
additional defined concepts. Following Placek, we will use
We :¼ fx 2 W j e\xg
to denote the set of events above e. Being snake-linked in We is an equivalence
relation on We (reflexivity and symmetry are obvious from the definition; for
transitivity, observe that snake-links in We can be easily concatenated). Thus we
have a natural partition Pe of We. If Pe has more than one member, we call e a
choice event. Indeterministic transitions can now be specified via such a choice
event e and one member of the partition Pe. We let CE(W) be the set of choice
events in W. Now we define the sets
WCe :¼ fx 2 W j 8c 2 CEðWÞðc\e ! c\xÞg;
which comprise all those events x that occur after any choice events in e’s causal
past. These sets play a crucial role in generalizing the notion of modal consistency,
so it is good to have a close look. Clearly, we have We  WCe ; by transitivity of\.
Figure 3 pictures the set We
C in a situation in which there are three choice events c1,
c2 and c3 in e’s causal past.
Based on the sets We
C, Placek’s definition of modal consistency (Placek 2011,









Fig. 3 Illustrating the sets We
C. c1, c2 and c3 are the choice events in e’s causal past indicated by the
dashed lines (c4 and c5 are outside that region). The region We
C is shaded grey; the boundary is not part of
We
C. Note that We
C contains all events above c5, even though events in different continuations of c5 are
incompatible
Footnote 15 continued
Definition 10 below for the precise meaning of ‘‘suitable’’ (and, derivatively, of ‘‘too far below’’), and
Fig. 3 for additional illustration.
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Definition 10 (Modal consistency, snake-link style) Let hW ; i be a partial order.
Elements e and f are modally compatible iff they are snake-linked in the region We
C
[ WfC. A subset A  W is modally consistent iff any two of its members are
compatible.
In order to elucidate this definition, it is helpful to see that directed sets are modally
consistent according to the new definition: in fact, if there is f 2 W such that e1 \ f
and e2 \ f, then we have f 2 We1 \ We2  WCe1 [ WCe2 ; and e1, f, e2 is a snake-link. It
is also easy to see that the new notion of modal consistency properly generalizes the
notion of directedness: e.g., in the one-history case, now any convex subset of Mn
(and in fact many other subsets) counts as modally consistent. So we have reached
our aim of generalizing the notion of modal consistency, and the generalized notion
has a claim to both naturalness and to counting as local, as no global viewpoint for
securing consistency is needed any more.
On the basis of the new definition, BST can be generalized in a relatively
straightforward manner, replacing ‘‘history’’ by ‘‘maximally modally consistent set’’
in the new sense. The axioms of BST referring to histories can then either be
retained, using the new sense of ‘‘history’’, or ‘‘localized’’, e.g., in the manner
described by Placek (2011, Def. 8). We will have to leave the question of the exact
interrelation between the old and the new framework for another occasion; see the
mentioned paper for some pertinent remarks.
Placek (2011) also suggests that snake-link based continuations can play a useful
role in semantics, replacing the history parameter in Ockhamist semantics by
something more properly local, viz., by a pair e/A, where A 6¼ ; and the set A [ {e} is
modally consistent. We will here develop a complementary approach, in which the
history parameter is replaced by a set of transitions (Sect. 4.3). But first we need to
work out more fully the notion of modal consistency in terms of sets of transitions.
4.2 Small Sets of Transitions
We will be working with a BST-structure OW ¼ hW ; i in which the basic
indeterministic transitions ti ¼ eiHi are identified; we will not consider trivial
transitions here. The set TR(OW) is the set of all basic indeterministic transitions in
OW, ordered by  (see Definition 8). In Sect. 3.3 above we mentioned a ‘‘top
down’’ approach to modal consistency in terms of transitions: a set T of transitions is
consistent iff all the transitions occur in one history, so that the intersection of the
outcomes of all transitions; HðTÞ ¼ \i2IHi; is non-empty—the transitions taken
together allow at least one history to occur. When trying to develop a local
perspective, this approach is not ideal, as it still works with sets of (global) histories.
The transition ordering is helpful for the necessary local perspective.
A general idea for spelling out modal consistency of transitions in terms of the
transition partial ordering is the following: A set that contains two transitions with the
same initial is obviously (‘‘blatantly’’) inconsistent. In the end, all inconsistency
should be due to blatant inconsistency. (This approach thus follows option (2) of Sect.
3.1). It is clear, however, that there can be inconsistency without blatant inconsis-
tency; a set of transitions does not have to give the whole story, so to speak. To
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illustrate, consider OW such that T = TR(OW) = {t1, t2, t3, t4}, where ti ¼ eiHi
and e1 = e2, i.e., the transitions t1 and t2 have the same initial. (So, T is blatantly
inconsistent.) Now suppose t1  t3 and t2  t4: The set T 0 = T - {t2} = {t1, t3, t4}
is not blatantly inconsistent: no two of the transitions in it have the same initial. T 0 is
however inconsistent: the initial e3 of t3 occurs in the outcome H1 of e1, while the
initial e4 of t4 occurs in the outcome H2 of e1 = e2, so that e3 and e4 cannot occur
together in one history, and accordingly, we have HðT 0Þ ¼ ;: In order to unmask the
inconsistency of T 0, we need to look at the downward closure of T 0, defined as
DCðAÞ ¼ ft 2 TRðOWÞ j 9t0 2 A t 
 t0g:
We call a set of transitions A  TRðOWÞ prima facie consistent iff DC(A) is not
blatantly inconsistent. It is easily seen that in our example of T 0, we have DC(T 0) =
T, and as remarked, T is blatantly inconsistent. So T 0 isn’t even prima facie
consistent.
Why the cautious ‘‘prima facie’’? In BT, the qualification is in fact unnecessary.
However, as spelled out in detail in Mu¨ller et al. (2008), the spatial aspect of BST
leads to complications here. Assume that A is prima facie modally consistent and
contains two non-order-related transitions t1 and t2 with different initials that are
space-like related. Can we be sure that A is really consistent—i.e., that HðAÞ 6¼ ;?
Even in the simplest case of A = {t1,t2}, this may be problematic, due to what is
called ‘‘modal funny business’’ (Belnap 2002b). It could be that local possibilities t1
and t2 do not combine to form a global possibility (i.e, admit at least one history
together); something like this may be what is behind distant quantum correlations
(quantum non-locality). Whatever the empirical facts, it seems clear that given the
possibility of such non-local effects, a purely local approach to consistency in terms
of transitions is doomed; the non-local modal correlations convey additional
information that is not present in the local transition ordering. Absent such funny
business, however, prima facie consistency is sufficient for consistency.16 In the
following, final section, we will revert to the framework of branching time, in which
modal funny business cannot occur as there are no space-like-related moments (i.e.,
moments in one history that are not order-related): by the definition of a history in BT
as a maximal linear chain, any two moments in one history have to be order-related.
4.3 Semantics in Terms of Sets of Transitions
We will now show how departing from the use of histories in semantics leads to a
more local analysis of the future tense in branching time structures.17 The basic idea
is to replace the semantic parameters of truth, which in standard Ockhamist
semantics are a moment m together with a history h, by a moment m together with a
set of transitions T. As in the standard case that requires m/h s.t. m 2 h; not any
combination of m and T is allowed as a parameter: m and T have to be compatible. In
terms of the set of histories allowed by T, H(T), the demand that m and T form a
16 See Mu¨ller et al. (2008) for a detailed discussion.
17 In what follows, we will make some remarks pertaining to an extension of our framework to BST. A
full exposition will have to be given in a separate paper.
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useable set of parameters of truth then is that T allows for m to occur: Hm \ HðTÞ 6¼ ;
(note that this enforces consistency of T). When we write ‘‘m/T’’, we thereby indicate
that that condition is met. We will presuppose a model based on a BT-structure
OW ¼ hM; i with a set of basic transitions TR(OW); a model will have the form
M ¼ hM;  ; vi: We will use the following defined notions in what follows:
• The set of transitions occurring before a moment m, TR(m), is
TRðmÞ :¼ fm0H0 2 TRðOWÞ j m0\m & Hm  H0g:
• Given a history h in OW, the set of transitions characterizing h, TR(h), is
TRðhÞ :¼ fm0H0 2 TRðOWÞ j h 2 H0g:
According to Lemma 1, this guarantees H(TR(h)) = {h}.
Our idea for using sets of transitions in the semantics is the following: a set of
transitions T admits a certain set of histories H(T). We can simply extend the
Ockhamist semantics in terms of m/h by quantifying over all histories from H(T)
where needed, without any changes to the model. Thus, the base case and the
propositional cases remain unchanged. (In line with what was said above, we always
assume that m/T is consistent in the sense that Hm \ HðTÞ 6¼ ;:)
• M; m=T  p iff v(m, p) = 1.
• M; m=T  :/ iff M; m=T 6 /:
• M; m=T  /&w iff M; m=T  / and M; m=T  w.
The T parameter is used, but not altered, in the clauses for the temporal
operators:18
• M; m=T  P/ iff for all h 2 Hm \ HðTÞ there is some m0 2 h for which m0 \ m
and M; m0=T  /;
• M; m=T  F/ iff for all h 2 Hm \ HðTÞ there is some m0 2 h for which m \ m0
and M; m0=T  /:
Note that the shifted index of evaluation used in both clauses, m0/T, again fulfills
the requirement that Hm0 \ HðTÞ 6¼ ;; as m0 2 h for some h 2 HðTÞ: Note also that
in the case of the past tense P, the parameter T plays no role; given past linearity of
BT structures, we could equivalently have written
• M; m=T  P/ iff there is some m0 \ m for which M; m0=T  /:
It is only with respect to the future tense F that anything interesting happens. To
see what, it is useful to look at two extreme cases. (a) If T = TR(h) for some history
h, we are back to the standard m/h semantics: there is only one single history, viz.,
the h 2 Hm \ HðTÞ; and m0 stays on h. So our semantics is an extension of standard
Ockhamism: we can get Ockhamism back if we want. (b) If T is maximally
unspecific given m, so that Hm  HðTÞ and accordingly, the clause for F quantifies
over all histories in Hm, we get back the Peircean truth conditions for F, demanding
18 In the clauses for the so-called historical modalities of settledness and, dually, historical possibility, T
would have to be altered by the semantic clauses. We omit a discussion of these operators here.
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a witness in each history through m. Note that this will always be the case if T ¼ ;;
and that our framework thus amounts to treating a Peircean index of evaluation,
consisting of a moment m only, as the moment/set-of-transitions pair m=;; which is
another welcome sign of continuity with established semantic frameworks. The
Peircean behavior in case (b) is the price to be paid for the fact that the given clause
does not leave any cases undecided and does not have to rely on supervaluations or
similar.
The most interesting cases are cases in between, in which the given T is neither
too big to be accessible (recall that a history in a BT structure stretches all the way
into the future—we are never in a position to point out a history uniquely), nor too
small to tell us anything above the fact that m is occurring. Are there such cases? A
context of utterance does not specify a history uniquely—that is, in a nutshell, the
assertion problem confronting Ockhamist semantics. Belnap (2002a) and MacFar-
lane (2003, 2013) both argue that in many cases in which a sentence is uttered at
some moment of context mC, we assess the sentence at a later moment of assessment
mA, when the occurrence of the indeterministic event the sentence was about has
been settled. Thus, e.g., if before a coin toss, I say, ‘‘it will land heads’’, and in fact it
lands heads, then from the perspective of that later moment, I can assess my earlier
utterance as having been true.19 Belnap and MacFarlane propose different ways of
making sense of that observation. Belnap uses a speech-act analysis according to
which later on, the earlier assertion is either vindicated or impungned, which can
have further normative consequences. MacFarlane, on the other hand, proposes a
postsemantics employing two contexts, both a context of utterance and a context of
assessment; relative to a certain context of assessment, a sentences uttered earlier
then can come out as true or false. The current proposal easily handles MacFarlane’s
approach, but it is more general, and it is also open towards a speech-act reading a` la
Belnap (we will however not comment on this in the following).
Let us fix a specific situation: at a moment mC (for ‘‘moment of context of
utterance’’), Peter utters the sentence / = ‘‘the coin will land heads’’. At the later
moment mA (‘‘moment of assessment’’), he says, ‘‘what I said was true’’. The right
diagnosis seems to be that while the sentence is contingent relative to the context of
utterance, and accordingly cannot be assigned a truth value there unless additional
information or structure is given, it is no longer contingent relative to the context of
assessment, so that assigning a truth value seems appropriate. We can give the
following definition of relative contingency based on the m/T semantics:
Definition 11 (Relative contingency) A sentence / is contingent w.r.t. M; m=T iff
there are histories h1; h2 2 HðTÞ s.t. M; m=TRðh1Þ  / and M; m=TRðh2Þ  :/:
It follows immediately that no sentence is contingent w.r.t. T for which
H(T) = {h}—that is the fact on which standard Ockhamist semantics rests. On the
other hand, many sentences pertaining to the future are contingent given
T = TR(mC) with mC the moment of utterance. In our example case, we have
19 If you’re tired of coin tossing, or if you think that Diaconis’s experiments about the deterministic
nature of a coin toss outcome given the initial conditions make this a bad example of a future
contingency, please fill in your favourite quantum mechanical example instead.
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contingency relative to M; m=TRðmCÞ; but not relative to M; m=TRðmAÞ; so that the
sentence can indeed be assessed relative to the context of assessment.
There are two advantages of our transition semantics over assessment sensitive
postsemantics for Ockhamism, as far as we can see: For one, the semantics is
uniform; no additional parameters are introduced to handle assessment. Everything
is dealt with in the uniform framework of m/T semantics. Second, while we are here
limiting discussion to branching time, the m/T approach easily extends to BST. In
fact in BST there is a second case of relative contingency: there can be no
knowledge about contingent happenings space-like related to a context of utterance,
so that there is contingency in the causal elsewhere (the region of space-time outside
the past and future light-cone). In general, then, contingency can be resolved by
expanding a given parameter T to some T 0)T : The recipe to ‘‘wait and see’’ that is
behind Belnap’s and MacFarlane’s approaches is a highly relevant special case of
this, but not the only one imaginable, especially in the context of a more general
information dynamics.
5 Conclusion
The guiding theme of the considerations in this paper is the following: useful
possibilities have to be identified below the level of maximally consistent sets, or
histories, in branching structures. This goes against the standard approach to
modality in terms of ‘‘possible worlds’’, which are likewise maximal. Branching
structures supply some useful resources for localizing possibilities in terms of modal
consistency. We have outlined two recent approaches for capturing that notion:
Placek’s ‘‘continuations’’ program and the ‘‘small sets of transitions’’ approach.
Combining ideas from both approaches, we have spelled out a novel semantics for a
temporal logic based on branching-time in which the index of evaluation is not a
moment/history pair, as in Ockhamism, but a pair consisting of a moment and a
(compatible) set of transitions. That semantics extends both Ockhamism and
assessment-sensitive postsemantics, and it promises to make branching-time based
temporal logic more tractable.
Acknowledgments I would like to thank Tomasz Placek and my audience at Krako´w, September 2010,
for stimulating discussions. The research leading to these results has received funding from the European
Research Council under the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) /
ERC Grant agreement nr 263227, and from the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research, grant nr
NWO VIDI 276-20-013. Special thanks to Antje Rumberg and to Leszek Wron´ski for comments on a
preliminary version, and to two anonymous referees for their detailed and helpful remarks.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
References
Belnap, N. (1992). Branching space-time. Synthese, 92(3), 385–434. See also the postprint 2003,
available on philsci-archive.
Alternatives to Histories? 363
123
Belnap, N. (2002a). Double time references: Speech-act reports as modalities in an indeterminist setting.
In F. Wolter, H. Wansing, M. de Rijke, & M. Zakharyaschev (Eds.), Advances in modal logic (Vol.
3, pp. 37–58). Singapore: World Scientific.
Belnap, N. (2002b). EPR-like ‘‘funny business’’ in the theory of branching space-times. In T. Placek, & J.
Butterfield, (Eds.), Non-locality and Modality (pp. 293–315). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Belnap, N. (2007). From Newtonian determinism to branching space-time indeterminism. In T. Mu¨ller, &
A. Newen (Eds.), Logik, Begriffe, Prinzipien des Handelns (pp. 13–31). Paderborn: Mentis. See also
Synthese, 188(1), 5–21, 2012.
Belnap, N., Perloff, M., & Xu, M. (2001). Facing the future. Agents and choices in our indeterminist
world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. K. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
MacFarlane, J. (2003). Future contingents and relative truth. Philosophical Quarterly, 53(212), 321–336.
MacFarlane, J. (2013). Assessment sensitivity. Relative truth and its applications (forthcoming).
Malament, D. (2012). Topics in the foundations of general relativity and Newtonian gravitation theory.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Preprint: http://www.socsci.uci.edu/*dmalamen/bio/
GR.pdf.
Mu¨ller, T. (2010). Towards a theory of limited indeterminism in branching space-times. Journal of
Philosophical Logic, 39, 395–423.
Mu¨ller, T., Belnap, N., & Kishida, K. (2008). Funny business in branching space-times: Infinite modal
correlations. Synthese, 164, 141–159.
Øhrstrøm, P. (2009). In defence of the thin red line: A case for Ockhamism. Humana.mente, 8, 17–32.
Øhrstrøm, P., & Hasle, P. (2011). Future contingents. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclo-
pedia of philosophy. Summer 2011 edition. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/future-
contingents/.
Placek, T. (2011). Possibilities without possible worlds/histories. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 40(6),
737–765.
Prior, A. N. (1967). Past, present and future. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sellars, W. (1963). Science, perception and reality, chapter Philosophy and the scientific image of man
(pp. 1–40). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Thomason, R. H. (1970). Indeterminist time and truth-value gaps. Theoria, 36, 264–281.
Thomson, J. J. (1977). Acts and other events. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
364 T. Mu¨ller
123
